When the analysts say “don’t overreact,” that’s when you know we’re in trouble.
I came across something this week from a missile expert named Fabian Hoffmann. He writes a Substack called “Missile Matters,” and his recent oreshnik missile analysis caught my attention at 4:47 AM while I was reviewing overnight developments. Patton was already awake. He always knows when something’s happening in the threat environment.
Now, I don’t usually take my strategic guidance from academics. But Hoffmann found something important here. He just doesn’t understand what it actually means.
The Expert Gets It Half Right
Hoffmann argues that Russia’s new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile is “overhyped” but “poses a real threat.” He’s correct on both counts. Where he loses me is in his conclusion that the “most prudent response is not to overreact.”
That’s exactly backwards.
Of course it’s overhyped. That’s what happens when you let fear define your posture. The weak see a new Russian missile and immediately start calculating how many interceptors they’ll need. The strong see the same missile and ask: what does this tell us about their vulnerabilities?
Hoffmann notes the missile has “limited projectile accuracy” and a CEP of “several hundred meters.” He says Russia faces “material constraints” and “opportunity costs.” He points out they can probably only build “a few dozen per year.” He’s doing the math. I respect that. But math without strategic intuition is just accounting.
What the Analysis Misses
Here’s what Hoffmann sees but doesn’t understand: he writes that Europe has “a substantial capability gap in deep-strike weapons” and that without America, Europe’s nuclear capabilities are “insufficient to credibly address Russia’s large and diverse nuclear arsenal.”
He frames this as a problem to be solved through gradual capability development. I frame it as a diagnosis of weakness that invites aggression.
You don’t solve weakness with five-year procurement timelines. You solve it with posture. With clarity. With the kind of resolve that doesn’t require an interceptor stockpile because it never lets the conversation get that far.
Hoffmann writes that “political guidance may diverge from military reasoning” when it comes to intercepting these missiles. He’s worried that politicians will waste Arrow 3 interceptors on low-value threats because they’re scared. I’m worried about the opposite: that the analysts will convince the politicians to absorb strikes while they run cost-benefit calculations.
The Real Oreshnik Missile Analysis
Here’s what I see when I look at this missile: Russia built a weapon system specifically designed to test whether Europe has the will to respond. Hoffmann calls it “a tool for escalation management.” I call it a probe. They’re checking if anyone’s awake over there.
The correct response isn’t to calculate whether the damage is “moderate” or whether interceptors should be “reserved for higher-priority targets.” The correct response is to make clear—immediately, unambiguously—that there is no version of this where Russia comes out ahead.
Hoffmann ends by saying the threat “stems less from the missile’s technical characteristics…than from the way it exposes and amplifies existing European capability gaps.” He thinks the answer is closing those gaps. I think the answer is not having gaps in the first place. Different philosophy.
I finished reading his analysis at 5:23 AM. Patton had moved to the window. He was watching something. I don’t know what. But he was watching.
That’s the difference between analysts and those of us who understand what strength actually requires. The analysts write reports. We stay ready.
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