A military historian diagnoses the disease correctly but prescribes exactly the wrong treatment.
A military historian named Phillips O’Brien wrote recently about constant military analysis failures in the American strategic community. I’ll give him this: he’s identified a real problem. American analysts have been consistently wrong about Ukraine, wrong about what matters in modern warfare, and wrong about how to advise our allies. He calls it “extraordinary confidence” combined with ignorance. On that much, we agree.
But then he loses the thread entirely.
Where the Academic Goes Wrong
O’Brien argues that Ukraine needs fewer soldiers on the battlefield, not more. He claims modern war is about “production” and “ranged weapons” rather than boots on the ground. He even mocks American voices telling Ukraine to lower its draft age to 18.
This is what happens when you study war from a university instead of understanding it in your gut.
Wars are won by men willing to fight. Period. You can have all the drones and missiles you want, but eventually someone has to hold territory. Someone has to project strength. The Ukrainians are brave, but bravery without numbers is just martyrdom. I’ve been saying this for months: you cannot win a war of attrition by reducing your forces. That’s not strategy. That’s surrender with extra steps.
The Real Problem With American Analysis
O’Brien is right that American analysts have become arrogant. He’s right that we’ve lost wars we should have won. But his diagnosis is backwards. The problem isn’t that we focus too much on “tactical” thinking. The problem is we’ve lost our understanding of what strength requires.
We’ve become soft. We talk about “trade-offs” and “social costs” instead of victory. We worry about draft riots from 1863 instead of winning the war in front of us. O’Brien actually cites the Civil War draft riots as a cautionary tale. You know what else happened in the Civil War? We won. Because Lincoln understood that sometimes you have to demand sacrifice.
My assessment—and I’ve been monitoring this situation since 2014, before most analysts knew where Donbas was on a map—is that Ukraine needs decisive escalation, not “nuanced discussion.” Patton agrees. He gets restless when I read these academic takes aloud. Dogs understand threat assessment instinctively.
What Real Strategic Thinking Looks Like
I wake at 0430 every day. I review the overnight developments before most Americans have finished sleeping. I don’t say this to boast. I say it because discipline is the foundation of strategic clarity. You cannot understand war if you are not prepared to sacrifice comfort for vigilance.
O’Brien has credentials. He has degrees. He has publications. What he doesn’t have is the instinct that comes from watching, constantly, and understanding what strength communicates to our adversaries. He thinks Ukraine should focus on “what it makes” rather than “the number of infantry it deploys.” That’s the thinking of someone who has never had to project resolve.
The Ukrainians have fought admirably. But they’re running out of time, and academics telling them to draft fewer people are not helping. Sometimes you need more men on the line. Sometimes you need to show the enemy you will never stop coming. That’s not arrogance. That’s how wars are won.
O’Brien sees the failures. He just doesn’t understand what would fix them. I do. I’ve been watching longer than most. And I’ll keep watching after the academics move on to their next publication.
About the Author
